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Liquidity in the Futures Pits:
Inferring Market Dynamics from Incomplete Data
Abstract
Motivated by economic models of sequential trade, empirical analyses of market
dynamics in the U.S. equities market frequently estimate liquidity from regressions of
price changes on transaction volumes, where the latter are signed (positive for buyer-
initiated trades; negative for seller-initiated trades).  This paper estimates these
specifications for transaction data from pit trading at the Chicago Mercantile Exchange.
To deal with the absence of timely bid and ask quotes (generally used to sign trades in the
equity market studies), this paper proposes new techniques based on Markov chain
Monte Carlo estimation.
As in the corresponding equity market specifications, the model structure implies
a decomposition for long-run price volatility into trade- and non-trade-related
components.  For the S&P contract, trades have a negligible contribution to volatility.
Trades in the pork belly contract account for twenty percent of the (long-term) price
volatility.  Trades in the DM contract account for forty percent of the volatility.  This last
finding may indicate that although the futures market in the DM is dwarfed in volume by
the interbank spot/forward market, the latter’s relative lack of transparency causes
significant price discover to occur in the futures market.
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1. Introduction
The Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME, “Merc”) is a major and representative
U.S. futures exchange, where most trading occurs face-to-face in physically-centralized
arenas (“pits”) on the Exchange floor.  As a trading mechanism, the pit presently faces
strong competition from electronic limit order book systems.  Many of the Merc
contracts, for example, are traded off-[floor]-hours on the Globex (and recently
introduced Globex2) systems.  In some contracts (e.g., the E-mini), floor and Globex
trading occurs simultaneously.   Although many observers feel that electronic trading will
eventually predominate, the floor mechanism possesses a reputation for excellent
liquidity and operational efficiency.  Against this institutional backdrop, the present study
aims at an improved characterization of the pit market mechanism.
By way of economic motivation, empirical market microstructure research seeks
to measure factors thought to be important in market design and operation.  Foremost
among these factors are the direct costs paid by demanders of immediacy in the market
and the impacts their trades have on the security price.  These are often jointly (and
loosely) held to summarize the market’s “liquidity”.
Economic models of sequential trade are, in this context, particularly important.1
In these models a quote-setter (often a dealer or market-maker) posts bid and ask quotes;
potential traders arrive one-by-one and buy or sell.  After the trader has departed, the bid
and ask are updated.  These models are relatively mathematically tractable and flexible.
Significantly (for empirical purposes), they also bear a passing resemblance to a wide
range of actual markets, including the futures pits.
The empirical studies derived from these models typically estimate regressions of
price changes against incoming signed order flows.  A buy order, for example,  is
                                                
1
 See Glosten and Milgrom (1985), Easley and O'Hara (1987); Easley and O'Hara (1991);
Easley and O'Hara (1992a); Easley and O'Hara (1992b) and O'Hara (1995).
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positively signed and hits (“lifts”) the prevailing ask quote.  Generally the transaction
price will exceed the expected value of the security (conditional on all information
available prior to the order arrival).  This excess reflects in part a transient cost paid by
the buyer for immediacy, and in part a permanent revaluation of the security.  These
analyses have become standard in studies of U.S. equities markets.2   The present paper
seeks to implement them for data from floor trading at the Merc.
 The standard implementation of the price/signed trade regression requires both
transaction (price and volume) and quote (bid and ask) data.  The latter are necessary to
assign a direction to the trade, usually by comparing the trade price to the quote midpoint.
Bids and asks in futures pits, however, expire (unless hit) virtually instantaneously.  In
consequence, a contemporaneous record of these quotes comparable to that available for
the equity markets does not exist.
Excellent prior studies of futures market liquidity are available.  Those based on
transaction-level data include Laux and Senchack (1992) and Ma, Peterson, and Sears
(1992).  These analyses employ return-autocovariance-based estimates of the bid-ask
spread, however.  This approach assumes that the direction of the trade is independent of
the price movement, and cannot therefore measure informational price impacts.
Manaster and Mann (1996) use Computerized Trade Reconstruction (CTR) data.  These
data (which are not in the public domain) establish trader identity, permit tracking of
trader positions, and so support a range of interesting analyses concerning inventory
control.  Manaster and Mann also estimate order impacts contingent on class of trader.
Identification of a buyer and seller does not, however, establish who initiated the trade (in
the sense of the sequential trade models), i.e., which party hit or lifted the bid or ask
exposed by the other.
                                                
2
  See, for example, Hasbrouck (1991a); Hasbrouck (1996a) and Madhavan, Richardson,
and Roomans (1997).
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It is emphasized that the absence of bid and ask data in the futures market studies
is due to limitations in observation and collection procedures.  Bids and asks are in fact
continually being conveyed within the trading crowd.  Trades occur when liquidity
demanders hit these quotes.  To this extent, the market structure fits the framework of the
sequential trade models.  But data normally essential to the estimation of these models
are missing.
It is nevertheless possible to perform estimation without a complete data record,
provided that one is willing to let the model structure and observed data bear the full
weight of the statistical inference.  In the present applications, the bid, ask and, most
importantly, the direction (sign) of a given trade are viewed as latent, unobserved
variables.  We sign a trade, or, (more accurately) derive a probability density for the sign
of the trade, conditional on the model and all observed data.
In modeling perspective, the analysis of Glosten and Harris (1988) stands as an
important precursor.  There, as in the present paper, transaction price and volume are
observed and the order sign and efficient security price are unobserved.  Glosten and
Harris numerically approximate the probability density functions for these variables
(conditional on the observed data) and the likelihood function for the observations.
Estimation proceeds by maximum likelihood.  The analysis falls within the general
approach to nonlinear state-space model described by Kitagawa (1987).  Glosten and
Harris apply the technique to a sample of NYSE transaction data.
The empirical model in the present paper generalizes on Glosten-Harris in
allowing a more flexible treatment of discreteness, clustering and trade-price impacts.  A
more fundamental difference, however, lies in estimation methodology.  The present
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paper employs a Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) estimator, the Gibbs sampler,
which is attractive both analytically and computationally.3
The models and methods presented here also differ from the usual empirical
market microstructure analyses in that they are cast in a Bayesian framework.  Bayesian
methods are usually employed to incorporate prior beliefs about model structure or
parameters.  Indeed, this consideration has not received proper attention in market
microstructure.  For example, despite our strong priors that the bid-ask spread is positive,
moment-based sample estimates using the Roll (1984) procedure are frequently
“negative” (or undefined).  But the more compelling motivation for the use of Bayesian
methods here lies in the analytical and computational ease with which latent variables
(such as the unobserved trade direction) may be incorporated.
The paper begins with a summary of the trading procedure and descriptive
statistics of the price and volume series.  This serves to establish features of the data that
arise in modeling.  The paper then turns to issues of modeling, estimation and economic
interpretation.  This part of the paper is organized around a series of models of increasing
richness and complexity, beginning with a reworking of the Roll model (Section 3), and
continuing through models that incorporate discreteness (Section 4), clustering (Section
5) and asymmetric information (Section 6).  The sequential presentation of the models
serves to illustrate Bayesian modeling and estimation principles that are, although well-
established and standard in other contexts, relatively unfamiliar in empirical
microstructure.  The reader uninterested in methodology may prefer to skip these sections
(3-6).  A comprehensive model is presented and estimated in Section 7.  A brief summary
concludes the paper in Section 8.
                                                
3
 Useful introductory references in this field include Gilks, Richardson, and Spiegelhalter
(1996) (for a concise overview of MCMC techniques), Casella and George (1992) (for
the Gibbs sampler) and Chib and Greenberg (1996) (for applications in econometrics).
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2. Data overview
This section describes the futures transaction data with a view to illuminating the
distinctive features of the data that an empirical model should account for, or at least
accommodate.
The Chicago Mercantile Exchange is a major U.S. futures exchange.  Their web
site (at www.cme.com) provides a comprehensive description of the Exchange,
instruments, trading mechanisms and data (including that used in the present study).  The
trading arrangements at the CME are typical of U.S. futures exchanges.  Traders interact
face-to-face on the exchange floor. They compete by shouting and signing acceptable
price/trade combinations.  Thus, bids and offers are transient, options that vanish unless
exercised immediately.  They are frequently refreshed, as a trader may continually repeat
a bid or offer.  But unlike the U.S. equity markets, there is no presumption that a bid or
offer is good until explicitly canceled or modified.  This transience does not, however,
invalidate the sequential trade framework, since we are still in a world where the quote
setter moves first and the (potential) “market order” trader follows.
An observer on the floor sees bids, offers and trades.  In real time, however, off-
floor participants must rely on the electronically disseminated tick data.  The reported
price is the most current trade price.  This is updated only when a trade at a new price
occurs.  This differs, of course, from the last sale reporting practices in U.S. equities
markets, wherein a trade is reported even if it is at the same price as the previous trade.
Smith and Whaley (1994) discuss estimators of the Roll bid-ask spread using time and
sales data.
The data used in the present study, however, are drawn from the CME’s volume-
tick files.  These data consist of time-stamped trade prices and volumes, i.e., a record
essentially similar to what one receives from the U.S. equity market’s Consolidated
Transaction System.  These data are synthesized (based in part on audit trail data) after
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the close of trading, however, and are not available to market participants in real time.
The sample is drawn from the volume-tick files for the first full two weeks of January
1998.4   This section summarizes characteristics of sixteen heavily-traded contracts.  In
subsequent sections, detailed time series analyses are described for three representative
contracts (pork bellies, the Deutschemark and the S&P composite index).
Table 1 describes various features of the analyzed contracts.  Of particular
relevance for the paper are the tick sizes.  As a proportion of the contract price, they are
often dramatically lower than those commonly encountered in equity markets.  A tick of
$1/16 is 0.125% of a $50 stock.  This is at least an order of magnitude greater than that of
any of the futures contracts.
Table 2 reports trade characteristics. These suggest the scale and timing of the
transactions.  For sheer pace of trading activity, the S&P composite contract stands out.
It exhibits an average intertransaction time of only four seconds.  Trades frequently
occurred within the same second.  The economic framework of the sequential trade
models generally assumes that trade reports are instantaneously disseminated and
evaluated.  In the S&P index pit, at least, an individual trader’s information set is unlikely
to be this current.
Table 3 reports standard deviations and first-order autocorrelations of the
intertransaction returns.  The returns are measured alternatively as difference in log price
and as difference in price level (measured in ticks).   The results for the level prices
suggest that intertransaction return volatility is not large relative to the tick size, and
therefore that discreteness may be an important consideration in assessing a contract’s
volatility.   The first-order autocorrelations are negative, presumably reflecting bid-ask
bounce.  This feature is discussed more completely in Section 3.
                                                
4
 The data files used are those from the CME’s website with a prefix “vt” (for volume-
tick).
Page 7
A phenomenon closely related to discreteness is clustering, the tendency of trades
(and presumably quotes) to cluster on “natural” multiples of the minimum tick.  There are
various ways of describing clustering.  In the NYSE data examined by Harris (1991), the
$1/8 tick clearly motivates “two-based” clustering on whole numbers, halves and
quarters.  The tick size across futures contracts, however, is not uniform.  A preliminary
look at the data suggests that more generality is needed.  Accordingly, this study
examines both two- and five-based clustering, i.e., the incidence of prices that fall on κ-
multiples of the minimum tick, where ji52=κ for small nonnegative integers i and j.
Letting 30 ≤≤ i and 20 ≤≤ j  generates a set of possible values for κ:
{ }200,100,50,40,25,20,10,8,5,4,2,1=Κ∈κ .
We invoke no economic or mathematical laws here.  This approach merely seems
to give rise to a set of numbers that many people would regard as natural or convenient.
The method of construction does imply, however, an (incomplete) ordering of its
members.  For example, if traders are observing an implicit tick size of κ=5, and seek to
establish a coarser tick, the “natural” choice is κ=10 (rather than κ=8).  In this sense, all
κ>1 have a finer predecessor. 5
Two descriptive measures are useful here.  Let fκ be the sample frequency of
prices that lie on a κ-multiple.  The clustering frequency is simply the excess above
expectation: ( )κκκ 1−= ff C .  It is also helpful to describe the incremental change in
clustering associated with moving from a finer to coarser κ  (in the sense of the ordering
above).  For example, clustering on multiples of two will elevate the incidence of four-
multiples.  The incremental clustering is defined in such a way as to correct for clustering
at the next finer level.  That is, 2244 fff C −=∆ , and so on.
                                                
5
 More precisely (letting “f ” denote “is preceded by”): 200f 100, 100f 50, 50f 25,
40f 20, 25f 5, 20f 10, 10f 5, 8f 4, 5f 1, 4f 2, 2f 1.   As a formalism, the predecessor
for κ is Max[κ/2,κ/5] restricted to the set K; the ordering is incomplete because we can’t
assert 8f 5 or 5f 8.
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Table 4 reports clustering frequency percentages for the sample contracts;
incremental clustering frequencies are given in Table 5.  The interaction between the two
measures may be illustrated for the feeder cattle contract.  The raw frequencies (not
reported in the table) are f2=76% and f4=39%.  In a large random sample, we would
expect 50% of prices to lie on even tick-multiples, so the clustering percentage at κ=2 is
%262 =Cf .  Given that 76% of prices lie on two-tick multiples, we would expect 38% to
lie on four-tick multiples.  The observed frequency exceeds this by 1% (the incremental
clustering Cf4∆  for this contract).
Table 4 implies that many (but not all) of the contracts exhibit clustering.
Clustering at multiple levels is in most cases a consequence of clustering at a relatively
fine level.  (Compare, for example, the clustering and marginal clustering percentages for
pork bellies and feeder cattle.)  A notable exception is the Nasdaq 100 contract, for which
there is pronounced marginal clustering at ten-multiples.
Economic explanations for clustering are varied.  Harris (1991); Harris (1994)
suggests that negotiating parties may adopt a supra-minimum tick convention as a device
for reducing the number of rounds of bargaining, and therefore the bargaining cost.  In
this view, the coarser rounding randomly works for and against a trader, tending to
average out to zero.  Traders economize on their bargaining time.  This cost savings is
presumably passed on to off-floor traders via competition in the market for broker
services.
It is also suggested, however, that when there are barriers to entry in the provision
of liquidity services, clustering may serve as an implicit collusive coordination
mechanism (see Kandel and Marx (1997) and Dutta and Madhavan (1997)).  This has
been most strongly alleged for the Nasdaq dealer market prior to the recent reforms.6
                                                
6
 The literature on clustering at Nasdaq is large.  Key references include Christie, Harris,
and Schultz (1994); Schwert (1997).
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Although the trading mechanism in the futures markets differs profoundly from
the dealer market structure of Nasdaq, there are also some striking similarities.  In their
study of the CTR data, Manaster and Mann (1996) note that “The most frequent
combination is a customer order . . . filled by a market maker . . . or local.” (p. 956).
Essentially, most liquidity seems supplied by dealers or quasi-dealers, rather than outside
customers.  Furthermore, the Nasdaq order preferencing arrangements that keep order
execution within a subset of dealers are mirrored by the futures exchanges’ Brokers’
Associations (U. S. Commodities Futures Trading Commission (1997)).  This paper does
not attempt to resolve the underlying reasons for clustering, however, which remain an
important topic for further research.
As a guide for modeling strategy, the analysis suggests to this point the following
considerations.  First, motivated by the economic sequential trade models, it seems
desirable (as in the equity market studies) to allow for trade-driven price impacts of both
a transient (cost-related) and permanent (informational) nature.  The results of this
section suggest that in addition, discreteness is important because the tick size is
generally on the same scale as intertransaction volatility.  Transaction prices furthermore
exhibit a tendency to clustering that is for some contracts highly pronounced.  With these
features in mind, we proceed to discuss a series of empirical specifications.
3. The Roll model of the spread
Roll (1984) presents a model that is, by reason of its simplicity and ease of
implementation, a useful starting point.  In this model, transaction prices behave as a
random-walk-plus-noise, wherein the random-walk is the efficient price of security and
the noise is “bid-ask bounce”.  Throughout this paper, the term “efficient price” will be
used in a sense common to the sequential trade models, the expected terminal value of the
security conditional on all public information (including the trade history).
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a. The basic model
A variant of the Roll model is as follows.  Let the efficient price be denoted Mt.
Its logarithm ( )tt Mm log=  is assumed to evolve as a random walk:
ttt umm += −1 (1)
where the ut are zero-mean innovations stemming from the arrival of new public
information.  The (log) bid and ask prices are given as
cma
cmb
tt
tt
+=
−= (2)
where c is the half-spread, presumed to reflect the quote-setter’s cost of market-making.
The direction of the incoming order is given by the Bernoulli random variable
{ }1,1 +−∈tq , where 1−  indicates an order to sell (to the quote-setter) and +1 indicates an
order to buy (from the quote-setter).  That is, qt specifies which side of the trade is, in
terminology sometimes encountered, the trade initiator or trade aggressor.  In security
markets we usually assume the Bernoulli outcomes equally likely, which implies a
symmetry in the order flow.  For expositional convenience, it will be assumed throughout
that the unconditional probabilities of either qt outcome is one-half.  This restriction can
easily be relaxed, and there are some markets (e.g., the real estate market) where it would
not be appropriate.
Most implementations of the Roll model assume that qt is independent of
tt um =∆ , i.e., that the direction of the trade is independent of the efficient price
movement.  This rules out the asymmetric information aspects of the sequential trade
models, and so is not an innocuous assumption.  For the sake of expositional clarity, we
initially adopt the assumption.  But it is not, in this paper’s approach, an essential
requirement, and is relaxed in Section 6.  Depending on qt, the (log) transaction price is
either at the bid or the ask:


+=
−=
=
1 if 
1 if 
tt
tt
t qa
qb
p (3)
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We typically possess a record of trade prices and seek to estimate the two model
parameters.
Estimation usually proceeds via method of moments.  The model implies a
variance and first-order autocovariance for the log price changes of:
( )
( ) 21
22
,
2
cppCov
cpVar
tt
ut
−=∆∆
+=∆
−
σ (4)
The corresponding sample moments imply estimates for 2uσ  and c that possess all the
usual properties of GMM estimators, including consistency and asymptotic normality.
The model forces the first-order autocovariance to be nonpositive irrespective of
the sign of c.  In sample data, however, this property is often violated. In his examination
of U.S. stock data, for example, Roll finds that autocovariance estimates based on 21
daily returns are positive roughly half the time.  In discussing the sampling properties of
this estimator, Harris (1990b) concludes that noise in typical applications will frequently
lead to positive autocovariances, even if the model is correctly specified.
b. Bayesian estimation
Our conviction that the spread must be positive is a prior belief, and as such is
most naturally incorporated in a Bayesian framework.  To illustrate, we augment the
model with a distributional assumption: ( )2,0~ ut Nu σ .  The model parameter set is
{ }cu ,2σ=Θ .  Denote the prior parameter density as ( )Θpi .  We seek the parameter
posterior ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )pfpfpf ΘΘ=Θ pi  where { }Tppp ,,1 K=  is the vector of observed
prices.
Direct evaluation of this posterior is beset by difficulties from the outset.  The
data likelihood function ( )Θpf  involves the unobserved { }Tqqq ,,1 K= .  No tractable
closed-form representation exists, and one is left with numerical approximations (Harris
(1990a)).  Incorporating the parameter prior complicates matters still further.
Surprisingly, the situation is simplified if we bring the unobserved (latent)
variables into the problem explicitly, writing the posterior as a joint conditional
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distribution over these latent variables as well as the parameters.  If we possessed this
posterior, ( )pqf ,Θ , we could obtain the parameter posterior by integrating out q.  It is
not immediately clear, however, that this would help matters.  The expanded posterior
( )pqf ,Θ  has substantially greater dimensionality and complexity than the one we
originally sought ( )Θpf .  Nor does the task of integrating out q (to obtain the parameter
posterior) appear trivial.
The MCMC approach neatly solves both problems.  In the first place, it works
with simulated samples.  If we possess a sample of draws from ( )pqf ,Θ  denoted
( ) ( ) Niq ii ,,1for  , K=Θ , then we can view the ( )iΘ  as originating from the marginal
( )pf Θ .   (Essentially we integrate out the q by discarding them.)  These draws can be
used to characterize all features of the posterior distribution.
Sampling, in turn, is facilitated by the Gibbs principle, wherein a draw from a
complicated joint pdf is built by cycling over (simpler) conditional pdfs.  The steps in this
sampling are:
0.  Initialize q.
1.  The conditional parameter draw: draw Θ from ( )qpf ,Θ .
2.  The conditional latent variable draw: draw q from ( )Θ,pqf .
We then generate the required sequence of draws by iterating between steps 1 and 2.  We
discuss the details of these conditional draws below, but it is first useful to summarize a
few general considerations.
Firstly, the technique of treating latent data and parameters equivalently is a
hallmark of modern Bayesian analysis (Tanner (1996)).  In this problem the latent data
arise naturally in the structural model, but in some situations latent variables of a more
artificial nature may be introduced as simplification devices.  As in the present instance,
however, this approach greatly expands the dimensionality of the problem, necessitating
numerical methods substantially more powerful than the numerical integration
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computations traditionally used.  Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) methods
(including the Gibbs sampler) have proven particularly useful in this respect.
The steps enumerated above describe a Gibbs sampler used at the top level of the
problem, iterating between parameters and latent data.  As will shortly be seen, however,
Gibbs samplers are used more pervasively here, within the parameter and latent data
simulations.  In fact, whenever possible, I rely in this paper on single-step Gibbs
samplers, in which each conditional draw is of a single random variable (parameter or
latent datum).  Among the various possibilities, these are usually the most tractable
analytically and most amenable to exposition (although they are frequently not the most
computationally efficient).  Finally, although the Gibbs sampler is valid under fairly
general conditions, these must not be taken for granted.  It will be seen that even for some
of the simple models considered in the present paper, certain single-step Gibbs samplers
that initially appear attractive fail.  Fortunately in these situations, there are usually
tractable alternatives (most commonly involving joint conditional draws).
This model (and all models discussed in this paper) can be written as nonlinear
(and non-Gaussian) state-space models.  Carlin, Polson, and Stoffer (1992) proposed
estimating such models with Gibbs samplers that single-step through time.  All of the
estimation strategies discussed in this paper are of this form.  (The joint draws used in
some models are joint across state variables at a single point in time.)  The nonlinear,
non-Gaussian framework is sufficiently general to encompass many modifications for
which single-step samplers may be computationally inefficient.  In such situations, when
a model can be expressed in a fashion that retains a high degree of Gaussian structure, the
blocked samplers proposed by Shephard (1994) and Carter and Kohn (1994) may be
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more useful. Manrique (1997); Shephard and Manrique (1997); Manrique and Shephard
(1998) discuss estimation when the observations are discrete.7
Conditional parameter draws.
The model implies
ttt uqcp +∆=∆ , (5)
i.e., a regression in which c appears as a coefficient.  This is easily handled within a
Bayesian linear regression framework.  (See the summary in the appendix.)  It is
convenient to apply the Gibbs principle again, breaking step 1 above into
1a.  Draw 2uσ  from ( )qpcf u ,,2σ
1b.  Draw c from ( )qpcf u ,,2σ
Note that it is not necessary to cycle between 1a and 1b “to convergence” before moving
on to step 2.   It is convenient to use a prior ( ) ( )2,σµpi += Nc , where ( )2,σµ+N  the
normal density with mean µ and variance σ2 truncated to the nonnegative real line.  (Note
that µ and σ2 serve as formal parameters only: the mean and variance of the truncated
density are not µ and σ2.)  A convenient prior for the variance parameter is the inverse
gamma.
Conditional latent data draws.
To execute the conditional latent draws, we invoke the Gibbs principle again,
making successive draws from the distribution defined by [ ]Θ,,Pr / pqq tt  where
{ }Ttttt qqqqq KK ,,,, 11/ +−= .  All of the Gibbs samplers described in this paper proceed in
this fashion.
                                                
7
 The evolution of approaches to MCMC estimation of stochastic volatility models is a
useful guide here.  See Shephard (1993); Jacquier, Polson, and Rossi (1994); Shephard
(1994); Shephard and Pitt (1997b); Kim, Shephard, and Chib (1998).
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Note first that the structure of the model implies that [ ]pqq tt ,Pr / =
[ ]tttt pmmq ,,Pr 11 +− .   (When discussing the data draws, we will notationally suppress the
parameter vector as a conditioning argument.)  From Bayes rule,
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]( )21,,Pr,Pr,,Pr,,Pr 11111111 ttttttttttttttt qmmpmmqqmmppmmq +−+−+−+− =∝ .
Furthermore, [ ] ( )1111 ,,,Pr +−+− ∝ ttttttt mmmfqmmp  where the latter is evaluated at
ttt cqpm −= .  The conditional distribution of mt is:
( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( )211
2
11
11
2
221
,
1,,2for  ,
2
,
2
,
,|
uTTT
utt
ttt
u
mNmmf
TtmmNmmmf
mNmmf
σ
σ
σ
−−
+−
+−
=
−=


 +
=
=
K (6)
To proceed, we compute ( )11, +− ttt mmmf  at ttt cqpm −=  for { }1,1 +−∈tq , normalize to
obtain the l.h.s. probabilities, and make the Bernoulli draw of qt.
Identification
In discussing the conditional coefficient draws, we imposed a prior belief of
nonnegativity on the half-spread parameter c.  While economically reasonable and
statistically desirable, this restriction (or something like it) is actually required to identify
the model.   This requirement derives from the two related conventions involving the
signs of qt and c.  It is customary to take 1+=tq and –1 to indicate incoming buy and sell
orders and c>0 to reflect the cost of market-making.  Yet since the two quantities appear
only in the product cqt, the model is observationally equivalent to one in which the order
signing is reversed (e.g., purchases are signed negatively) and c<0.  Without the
restriction that c>0, the posterior draws will (in time) cycle over both possibilities.  We
would expect to see posteriors (both for c and the qt) symmetric about zero (and quite
possibly bimodal).  Simulations verified that this indeed occurs.  The analyst examining
only the posterior means or medians would conclude that the data possessed no power in
assigning trade direction and that trading costs were zero.
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Monitoring and summarizing the estimation process
The output from the Gibbs sampler described above is a sequence of parameter
estimates ( ) .,,1for  , Nii K=Θ  where N is the number of simulations.  After the process
has mixed sufficiently that the influence of the starting values is negligible (the “burn in”
period), this sequence may be viewed as a set of dependent draws from the desired
posterior.  The matters of judgement here involve deciding the size of N and the length of
the burn-in period (i.e., portion of the initial N draws to be discarded).  There are no
universally accepted tests here, but all sources recommend visual (graphical) assessment
of the individual parameter draws.  In summarizing the parameter posteriors, we report
here means, together with standard errors corrected for serial dependence, and standard
deviations.
It is often convenient to discuss transformations of the model parameters (σu
rather than 2uσ , for example.   It is easy to analyze the posterior distribution of an
arbitrary transformation, say ( )Θ= Fθ , since the sequence ( ) ( )( )ii F Θ=θ  is a sequence of
draws from this distribution.
Model Comparisons and Specification Analysis
Model comparison in a Bayesian framework is performed using the posterior odds
ratio, or (as the number of observations becomes asymptotically large) the Schwarz
information criterion.  The necessary numerical likelihoods could be computed using the
auxiliary particle filter approach of Shephard and Pitt (1997a).  These are used in
Hasbrouck (1998b), but have not yet been implemented for the present models.
Although the models discussed in this paper do not in general possess “estimated
residuals”, it may be useful to examine related quantities.  In forming parameter estimates
with the Gibbs sampler described above, we “discarded” the simulated latent data, the
( )i
tq  for t=1,…,T and i=1,…,N.  In fact, these are in principle drawn from the smoothed
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distribution: ( ) ( )Ttit ppqfq ,,~ 1 K , and the average (over i) ( ) Nqq itt ∑=ˆ is an estimate
of the expectation of this smoothed distribution.
Smoothed quantities are useful in assessing the ability of the estimation procedure
to recover latent data.  In the present model, the trade direction variable has the property
that ( ) 1Var =tq .  If the data and model parameters are such that the smoothed estimates
tqˆ are always close to –1 or +1, we would conclude that that the model and data are
signing the trades reliably.  With a little more structure, we can derive a more intuitive
measure.  Let piC be the probability that a trade is correctly classified on a given draw, i.e.,
( )[ ]11Pr +=+== ittC qqpi  = ( )[ ]11Pr −=−= itt qq .  Given the assumed symmetry of the
trades, ( )[ ]11Pr +=+== titC qqpi  = ( )[ ]11Pr −=−= tit qq .  It follows that
[ ] [ ]( )
( ) ( )( )[ ] ( ) ( )( )[ ]( )
( )2
22
222
12
111111
2
1
1ˆ1ˆ
2
1
ˆ
−=
+−+−+−−++=
−=++==
C
CCCC
ttttt qqEqqEqE
pi
pipipipi (7)
This in turn suggests that piC may be estimated by
( )( ) 2ˆ1ˆ tC qVar+=pi (8)
It must be emphasized that this estimate measures the classification accuracy only in a
conditional sense, assuming that the model is correctly specified.  It is not an overall
measure of model fit.  At best it suggests the ability of the model and data to support
inference about a key latent variable.
c. Application to the futures market data
The model discussed in this section is naïve in many respects, some of which will
be remedied later.  Its tractability nevertheless recommends it as a starting point for
analysis.  First, by way of preliminaries, Table 6 reports moment estimates of the Roll
model for each contract.  In all cases, the sample first-order return and price change
autocovariances are negative, so the problem of imputing a negative or undefined spread
mentioned above does not arise.
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The model discussed above was estimated for the three representative contracts
for the first 1,000 trades in the sample using 10,000 draws of the Gibbs sampler.8
Convergence and mixing were monitored visually.  While space considerations preclude
full presentation of these results, the graphical output for the pork belly contract (Figure
1) is typical.  For both parameters, there are three graphs.  The left-most graphs depict the
draws themselves, which evince no obvious large persistent components.  The
autocorrelations of the draws are low (middle graphs) and the histograms of the draws
(right-most graphs) suggest well-defined densities.
Table 7 presents summary statistics for the (simulated) model posterior
distributions.  We focus here primarily on the posterior means of the c (log-half-spread)
parameters.  In comparing these estimates with the moment-based estimates in Table 7,
one might expect substantial agreement, since both are based on the same model and
sample.  Differences exist, however (most strikingly for the pork belly contract).
The discrepancies in the estimates appear to arise from differences in how the two
approaches use sample information.  For example, with the moment approach, all of the
negative autocovariance is attributed to the trading cost parameter c.  In the Gibbs
approach, c is a coefficient in a regression that assumes (but does not enforce)
independence of residuals.  To further explore the sources of differences would serve
little purpose, however.   Construction of a more realistic more stands as a more pressing
concern.
                                                
8
 The models in this paper were investigated with both diffuse proper priors and
noninformative (frequently improper) priors.  Although it is generally impossible to
verify that improper priors lead to proper posteriors in Gibbs samplers, the results in the
present case were substantially similar.  For brevity, only the results based on the
noninformative priors are reported.
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d. Further perspectives on signing trades
Given the importance attached by the sequential trade models to order direction, it
is not surprising that this has arisen as a perennial concern in microstructure modeling.  In
the NYSE’s unusually-detailed TORQ dataset (Hasbrouck (1992); Hasbrouck (1996b)), it
is possible to associate many trades with the actual underlying orders.  More commonly,
however, trade direction is inferred from related price data.  As noted in the introduction,
the usual practice is to sign trades by reference to the prevailing quotes (see Hasbrouck
and Ho (1987),  Hasbrouck (1988), Lee and Ready (1991) and Odders-White (1997)).
Consider the following hypothetical analysis.  In a sample of transaction price
data, we adopt the following rule.  If a price pt occurs on an uptick (or zero-uptick), we
set qt=+1; on a downtick (or zero-downtick), we set qt=–1.  We then estimate equation (5)
using the constructed qt as regressors.    This analysis is highly improper because our
classification rule induces correlation between measurement errors in qt and the model
disturbance.  Yet in the present framework, we seem to be drawing inferences about trade
direction that are very similar.  A pattern of successive price upticks, for example, will be
viewed as a procession of “buy” orders.  It might therefore appear that the present
analysis falls to the same objections as the proposed naïve one.
There are, however, two crucial differences.  First, the present procedure does not
assign to a trade a single direction that is used in all subsequent computations.  Instead, it
imputes a probability density over both (buy and sell) alternatives.  In this sense, the
procedure explicitly models the measurement error (uncertainty) concerning trade
direction.  In the second place, the trade directions and model parameters are estimated
jointly.  This essentially allows uncertainty about model parameters to affect uncertainty
about trade direction.  We are still, of course, assuming that the model is correctly
specified.  But we do not assume “full knowledge” (i.e., correct parameter estimates) of
the model in the process of assigning trade direction.
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e. Random costs of market making
The model discussed to this point assumes a constant half-spread c. Because
market conditions are likely to be changing, it is a useful generalization to permit this
cost to vary randomly.  This modification corresponds to letting c in equation (2) be
replaced by ct, an iid nonnegative random variable. This modification adds T new latent
random variables: Ttct ,,1 , K= .  One might be tempted to modify the above Gibbs
strategy by reasoning as follows.  At the conditional latent data draw step we need to
simulate the ct, but this simulation consists of a trivial calculation: given ttt qmp  and , ,
( ) tttt qmpc /−=  (an identity).  We then proceed to draw qt as previously described.  A
moments reflection will confirm, however, that with this procedure ct can’t move.
There are two ways to remedy matters.  First, we can replace the improper
sequential Gibbs draw with a (joint) draw from the joint conditional distribution
( )K,,, tttt pqcmf .  This is slightly involved due to the conditioning on the identity.  An
alternative approach, perhaps surprisingly, is to abandon the model in favor of one that is
more complicated (and realistic).  The next section describes such a model.  Among other
things, the incorporation of discreteness introduces a freedom of motion for ct that
simplifies the sampling.
4. Discreteness.
In the original Roll model, bids, asks and transaction prices are considered to be
continuous random variables.  In fact, virtually all markets constrain the support of these
quotes to a discrete lattice defined as integer multiples of the “tick” or “pip”.  The tick
size is of economic interest because it is related to the cost of achieving time priority, and
therefore to the supply of liquidity (Harris (1997a); Harris (1997b)).  From a data-
modeling perspective, the tick size is important because it is often of magnitude similar to
that of the spread and short-term price movements.  Harris (1990a) suggests a latent-
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variable model of rounded transaction prices.  Hasbrouck (1998a) surveys this and other
approaches taken to modeling discreteness, and proposes the model used below.
a. The model and associated Gibbs sampler
Taking the previous model as a starting point, equation (2) is modified to reflect a
rounding transformation:
[ ]
[ ]ttt
ttt
CMA
CMB
+=
−=
Ceiling
Floor (9)
where B and A are the level bid and ask and ( )tt mM exp= .   []⋅Floor  and []⋅Ceiling  round
their arguments asymmetrically, down and up (respectively) to the next grid point.  (It is
assumed that the data are scaled so that the tick size is unity.)  The price dynamics for the
implicit efficient price are the same as in the previous model, the log random walk given
in equation (1).  Quote discreteness in the model is (as in reality) imposed on the levels.
The cost variable Ct is now stated in level terms.  It is considered to be a nonnegative
random variable.  From an economic perspective, Ct may most conveniently be
interpreted as the marginal cost of market-making.  The asymmetric rounding ensures
that the dealer faces no expected loss.  Hasbrouck discusses further economic aspects of
this model.
Conditional parameter draws
Economic theory gives little guidance in choice of distribution for Ct , other than
the presumption that it must be nonnegative.9  Two obvious candidate distributions are
the lognormal (used in Hasbrouck (1998b)) and exponential.  Both are easy to draw from,
and both are easily parameterized within a Bayesian framework.  As in the previous
model, the inverted gamma distribution is a convenient prior for 2uσ .  The update and
                                                
9
 While the “dealer cost” interpretation of Ct suggested above makes nonnegativity
appear reasonable.  Broader interpretations may render it questionable (see Hasbrouck
(1998a)).
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posterior draw are slightly different, however.  The ut employed for the update are no
longer regression residuals (as in equation (5)).  They are instead computed from the
simulated mt: 1−−= ttt mmu .
Conditional latent data draw
The procedure employed in the last section must be modified as follow.  At each
point in time, the model now possesses three unobserved (latent) state variables: mt (or
equivalently Mt) , qt and Ct.  It might be supposed that simulation of these three variables
could be achieved by a succession of Gibbs draws.  This turns out to be only partially
true, however.
The cost parameter Ct may indeed be drawn from its full conditional distribution
( )tttt PqMCf ,, .  (For notational simplicity, the parameters of the unconditional
distribution of Ct have been suppressed.)  Given Mt and qt we know whether the trade
price was the bid or the ask.  From equation (9), this imposes truncation bounds on Ct:
1 if ,1
1 if ,1
−=−<<−−
+=−<<−−
qPMCPM
qMPCMP
ttttt
tttttt (10)
We may simply draw Ct from its unconditional distribution, subject to these bounds.
These bounds give Ct a latitude of motion, in contrast to the random-cost model
suggested in Section 3 prior to our consideration of discreteness.
Matters are not so simple for the other two variables.  In the model of Section 3,
knowledge of pt, c and qt suffices to determine mt.  This is no longer true.  Even if we
condition on Ct , the discreteness transformation only serves to bound Mt.  Suppose that
we attempt to construct a Gibbs sampler along the following lines.  We will first draw Mt
from ( )tttttt CqPMMMf ,,,, 11 +−  and then draw qt from ( )tttttt CPMMMqf ,,,, 11 +− .
Suppose that going into the first Mt draw we have qt=+1 (“a buy order”).  This means that
the transaction price is equal to the implicit ask quote, which implies (from the bounds in
(9)) that ttt CPM −< .  When we move to the qt draw, this last restriction implies qt=+1.
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For an MCMC simulator to work, it must be capable of reaching all points in the support
of the density.  In this example, the Gibbs sampler fails because  qt=–1 can never be
realized.
Fortunately it is easy to draw from the joint bivariate conditional density
( )tttttt Cpmmqmf ,,,, 11 +− .  First note that ( )11, +− ttt mmmf  is unchanged from equation (6)
Given Ct equation (9) imposes truncation bounds.  In terms of the level variable Mt:
1 if ,1
1 if ,1
−=++<<+
+=−<<−−
tttttt
tttttt
qCPMCP
qCPMCP (11)
For notational convenience, denote the set of mt that satisfies the appropriate restriction as
( )ttt qCP ,1− .  The conditional probability that Pt is at the ask is:
[ ] ( )( )∫ −∈ +−+− ∝ tttt qCPm ttttttttt dmmmmfCPmmq , 1111 1 ,,,,Pr (12)
We only need to compute this for qt=1±, normalize, and draw qt from the implied
Bernoulli distribution.  Next, note that ( )ttttt qPmmmf ,,, 11 +−  is proportional to
( )11, +− ttt mmmf  truncated to the region implied by qt in equation (11), so we may simply
make the truncated draw.10
b. Application to the futures data
The discreteness model was implemented for the three representative contracts for
cost distributions assumed to be either lognormal or exponential  Over a wide range of
priors and starting values, however, the convergence properties of the estimators was
poor.  The results for the exponential-cost model of the pork belly contract (Figure 2) are
                                                
10
 It might be supposed that a simpler model would result by forcing Ct to be constant
over time (as in the original Roll model).  Although this simplifies the model in a
conceptual sense, it leads to a major degradation of the Gibbs sampler outlined above.  If
CCt = is regarded as fixed over time, a new value of C must be drawn subject to the
intersection of the bounds given in (10) for all t.  This severely restricts the extent to
which C can change in successive draws.  The problem is aggravated in large samples.
Simulations confirmed that the sampled values of C exhibited extremely large
persistence.
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typical.  The two model parameters are the mean of the exponential distribution
(“Mu_C”) and σu (“SD_u”).   The draws (particularly for the cost parameter) manifest
poor mixing and large persistent deviations.  Autocorrelations are high.
In fixing the cause of this disappointing performance, suspicion must first fall on
the estimation methodology.  The Gibbs sampler used here is a single-step procedure.  It
is known that when parameters and/or latent data are highly correlated, such samplers are
prone to poor convergence, and should be avoided in favor of “block” samplers.  The
convergence problem did not generally arise, however, in simulated data sets.  Thus,
although this possibility cannot be excluded entirely, it does not seem to be arising from
the limitations of the sampler.
It is more reasonable to conjecture that model misspecification and data
limitations preclude reliable identification of the cost parameters. Even if we could
observe the actual bid and ask quotes, inference about the cost parameters would be
based on grouped data (where the grouping is driven by discreteness).  If the grouping is
coarse (as seems likely) in the present application, the inference is severely impaired.
Matters are further aggravated here because the bid and ask are not observed.
Furthermore, in studies where the bid and ask are observed, the lognormal distribution
appears to imply large-spread occurrence frequencies that are higher than those found in
the data.  (Manrique and Shephard (1997)) note this for an NYSE stock; Hasbrouck
(1998b), for Deutschemark/US dollar quotes in the interbank FX market.)
Correct modeling of implicit quote exposure costs thus remains as an important
area of further research.  For present purposes, however, the apparent lack of
identification of this cost will be handled by suppressing this cost entirely, that is, by
setting Ct=0.  This does not, of course, force the spread to zero: the rounding mechanism
specified in (9) ensures a one-tick spread.  Spreads larger than this will be assumed
generated by clustering (as described in the next section), and we defer further
estimations to then.
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From a methodological viewpoint, the decision to set the implicit continuous cost
to zero does not arise from a belief that these costs are economically zero.  It is, rather, a
frank admission that these costs cannot be reliably estimated.  In models that ignore
discreteness and clustering, apparently well-behaved estimates will arise (as in the
previous section).   These estimates are, however, artifacts of discreteness and clustering
transformations that are more properly modeled directly.
5. Clustering
As noted in Section 2, futures transaction prices frequently exhibit pronounced
clustering.  Hasbrouck (1998b) suggests that clustering in bid and ask quotes be modeled
as a consequence of an implicit tick, a natural multiple of the minimum tick, that arises as
a trading convention or from individual preference.  Clustering in bid and ask quotes
naturally gives rise to clustering in the transactions that occur at these quotes.  The results
presented in Table 4 suggest that pork belly prices exhibit a strong tendency to cluster on
even (“two-multiple”) prices.  S&P contract prices have a modest preference for
multiples of five.  The Deutschemark contract prices are not strongly clustered.
a. The model and associated Gibbs sampler
Clustering is imposed on the (unobserved) bid and ask quotes by using
generalized rounding functions:
[ ]
[ ]tttt
tttt
KCMA
KCMB
,Ceiling
,Floor
+=
−= (13)
where Kt denotes the tick-multiple to which rounding will occur.  In economic terms, Kt
is the implicit tick size.  While Kt might modeled in a very general fashion, the
specifications estimated here will allow for only two possible values: one (that is, the
regular tick increment) and κ, a single dominant multiple.  In the present analyses, κ=2
for the pork belly contract and κ=5 for the S&P contract.  Although the Deutschemark
contract prices are not strongly clustered, for the sake of estimating all specifications in
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parallel, clustering with κ=2 will be allowed.  As in Hasbrouck (1998b), it is convenient
to assume an i.i.d. Bernoulli distribution:
( )

 −
=
k
k
Kt
 prob.  w.,
1 prob.  w.,1
κ
(14)
The Bernoulli probability parameter k may be interpreted as the clustering intensity.
Hasbrouck (1998b) uses this framework in modeling foreign exchange bids and
asks that are actually observed.  The present situation is more challenging in that we do
not observe these quotes directly, only transaction prices.  The Gibbs procedure proposed
in the last section must be modified in two respects.  There is, firstly, one more parameter
to be estimated (k) in the parameter draw step.  Secondly, the latent data draw at each
time t now involves four latent state variables: Mt , Ct , qt and Kt.
Conditional parameter draw
The parameter draw is uncomplicated.  The number of “hits” (instances of Kt=κ)
in a sample of T observations is a binomial random variable.  A conjugate prior for the hit
probability is the Beta distribution.  The posterior is updated on the basis of the
(simulated) Kt, and a random value of k is drawn.  (See the appendix.)
Conditional data draw
The latent data draw is slightly more involved.  The draw for Ct is subject to
truncation bounds derived from (13) (cf. equation (10) for the nonclustered case):
1 if ,
1 if ,
−=−<<−−
+=−<<−−
ttttttt
ttttttt
qPMCKPM
qMPCMKP (15)
As before, we may draw from the unconditional distribution of Ct subject to the relevant
truncation bound.
As in the previous model, Mt (or mt) and qt must be drawn jointly.  It is also
convenient (and computationally efficient) to draw Kt jointly as well.  Given Pt , Kt and qt,
the bounds on Mt implied by (13) are:
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1 if ,
1 if ,
−=++<<+
+=−<<−−
ttttttt
ttttttt
qKCPMCP
qCPMKCP (16)
As above, denote the set of mt that satisfies this restriction as ( )tttt qCKP ,,1− .
If the transaction price Pt does not lie on a κ-multiple, we can’t have clustering.
In this case Kt=1 and we may make the joint draw of Mt and qt exactly as in the previous
model.  On the other hand,  the observation that Pt does lie on a κ-multiple does not
imply Kt=κ.  (It might be the case that Kt=1 and the configuration of the other variables
maps to a transaction price that just happens to be a κ-multiple.)
In drawing qt and Kt here there are four possibilities: ( )∈tt Kq ,
{ } { }κ==×−=+= tttt KKqq ,11,1 .  Although qt and Kt are unconditionally independent
(by assumption), they are dependent conditional on other model variables.  The joint
conditional distribution of qt and Kt therefore has probabilities:
[ ] [ ] [ ] ( )[ ]
[ ] [ ] ( )( )∫ −∈ +−
−
+−
=
∈∝
tqtCtKtPtm
tttttt
ttttttttttttt
dmmmmfKq
qCKPmKqmmCPKq
,,
1 11
1
11
,PrPr                                          
,,PrPrPr,,,|,Pr
(17)
where [ ]tqPr  and [ ]tKPr  are the unconditional probabilities and the conditional density
for mt is given in equation (6).  To proceed, we compute the r.h.s. of (17) for all values of
qt and Kt, normalize to obtain the l.h.s. conditional probabilities, and make the joint draw
of qt and Kt.  Finally, given qt and Kt we draw mt from the conditional distribution
( )11, +− ttt mmmf  subject to the truncation ( )ttttt qCKPm ,,1−∈ .
b. Application to the futures data
The model with discreteness and clustering was estimated for the three
representative contracts.  Following the remarks in the last section, the quote exposure
cost Ct was fixed at zero, thus forcing discreteness and clustering to account for all of the
market’s bid-ask spread.  Visual monitoring of convergence suggested that that the Gibbs
sampler performed well.
Table 8 summarizes the results.  Most importantly, estimates of the clustering
probability parameters (the k’s) are consistent with the tick-multiple statistics in Table 4.
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For the pork belly contract, k=74%.  The S&P contract exhibits low, but discernible
clustering.  For the Deutschemark contract, k is virtually indistinguishable from zero.  For
all three contracts, the estimated sign classification accuracy (piC) is high.  In the case of
the pork belly contract, this represents a significant improvement from the value
associated with the model absent discreteness and clustering (cf. Table 7).
6. Asymmetric information
The basic model and the variants presented above assume that the innovation to
the efficient price is independent of the incoming order, i.e., that the quote setter infers
nothing from this order.  This is particularly restrictive given the modern view that a
security market should function as an aggregator of diverse private information.  An
essential characteristic of the sequential trade models is the possibility that the incoming
trade is a signal for the traders private information, and that the quote setter will make
optimal use of this signal in updating her bid and ask.
The introduction of asymmetric information complicates the model’s conditional
distributional in certain respects.  Although the full model eventually estimated will allow
for the imperfections discussed in earlier sections, it is best for expositional purposes to
examine asymmetric information apart from discrete, clustering and random costs of
quote exposure.  Accordingly, the simplified model discussed below is a straightforward
modification of the basic Roll model discussed in Section 3.
A modification of equation (1) that permits the incoming trade to affect the
efficient price evolution is
ttttt uvqmm ++= − λ1 (18)
where vt is the unsigned transaction volume (e.g., 100 shares, contracts or whatever), qt is
(as before) the direction of the trade, and λ is an impact coefficient (sometimes termed
the “liquidity” parameter).  This interpretation of the ttvqλ  term is intuitively useful, but
the following developments are considerably more general.  If we only know that a trade
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has occurred, but are ignorant of its size, the term can be replaced by “ tqλ ”, in which
case λ will reflect the directional impact of a trade of unknown size.  Alternatively, vt
may be a vector-valued transformation of the trade size (possibly including an intercept,
linear and quadratic terms as in Hasbrouck (1991a)), in which case λ is a coefficient
vector.  Although this formulation presumes that buys and sells affect the price in a
symmetric fashion, this too could be generalized.
From an economic perspective, ttvqλ reflects the price adjustment based on the
signal of private information that the quote-setter infers from the trade.  The disturbance
ut plays a narrower role than before.  It now solely reflects non-trade public information,
and is assumed independent of qt and vt.  It is provisionally assumed that trades take place
exactly at the efficient prices, i.e., tt mp = .  This is along the lines of the Glosten and
Milgrom (1985) model, with no trading costs (aside from those associated with the
informational asymmetry).
Equation (18) may be written as the regression:
ttttt uvqmp +=∆=∆ λ (19)
This implies a variance decomposition for the log efficient price changes:
( ) ( )
( )
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This decomposition has economic content in that it highlights the relative importance of
trading for the price discovery process (Hasbrouck (1991b)).
Estimation is based on a data record of prices and volumes for each trade:
Ttvp tt ,,1for   and K= .  There are two model parameters, 
2
 and uσλ ; the latent variables
are Ttqt ,,1, K= .
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Conditional parameter draw
The conditional parameter draws (assuming that the qt are known) are
straightforward and similar to those for the original Roll model. We simply estimate
equation (19) in a Bayesian regression framework, subject to the identification restriction
0≥λ .
Conditional data draw
Conditional simulation of the latent trade direction qt proceeds as follows.  First
note that the conditional distribution of mt is:
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )211
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2
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In contrast to all of the earlier models the conditional density for mt generally depends
(via the mean) on qt.
The conditional probability of the trade sign is:
    
[ ] [ ] ( ) [ ]111111111/ ,,Pr,,,,,,Pr,Pr ++−++−++− ∝= tttttttttttttttt mqmqqmqmmfpqmmqpqq (22)
evaluated at tt pm = .  In contrast to the earlier analyses, however,
[ ] [ ] 21Pr,,Pr 111 =≠++− ttttt qmqmq , so a further computation is required.
[ ] ( )∫+∞
∞−
+−+++− ∝ tttttttttt dmqqmmmfmqmq 111111 ,,,,,Pr (23)
where ( ) ( ) ( )ttttttttttt qmmfqmmfqqmmmf ,,,,, 111111 −+++−+ = , given the structure of the
model.
We proceed by first computing the r.h.s. of (23) for 1+=tq  and 1−=tq .  (The
integration is trivial given the normality of ut.)  We normalize to obtain the l.h.s.
probabilities.  We plug the latter into the r.h.s. of (22) (for 1+=tq  and 1−=tq ) and
normalize (again) to obtain the l.h.s. probabilities.  The latter are the conditional
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Bernoulli probabilities necessary to make the draw of qt.  Given qt, we draw mt from
( )111 ,,, ++− ttttt mqqmmf  or its variant given in equation (21).
When we incorporate discrete, clustering and random costs of market making, the
first set of computations (those related to (23)) are unaffected.  The conditional density
for mt on the r.h.s. of (22), however, is replaced by the integration of this density over the
relevant feasible region for mt.
7. A generalized asymmetric information model
The model presented and estimated in this section combines features discussed
above.   The log efficient price dynamics are:
( )211101 ,0~  where utttttttt Nuuvqvqmm σλλ +++= −−−
where qt is the trade direction indicator.  In this model, vt is a bivariate function of the
trade volume: [ ]′= tt Volumev 1 .  The square-root transformation motivated by trade-
price impact studies in equity markets that generally find concavity in the relation.  An
intercept is included to allow for non-size-related directional effects.  The λ’s are
conformable coefficient vectors: [ ]
,, iConstii λλλ =  for i=0,1. Identification is ensured by
requiring all elements of the λ’s to be nonnegative.
The specification permits dependence on lagged trades, effectively allowing the
impact of a trade to be distributed over time.  The theoretical sequential trade models
generally assume that adjustment is instantaneous, but delays in information transmission
(even across a trading pit) and trader reaction times may quite plausibly result in lagged
adjustment.  Lags have also been found useful in the corresponding equity market
specifications.
The remaining elements of the model define the clustering:
( )

 −
=
k
k
Kt
 prob.  w.,
1 prob.  w.,1
κ
quote formation:
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As in the implementations of the previous models with discreteness and clustering, the
rounding is assumed based directly on Mt, with no additional implicit cost of market
making.
The Gibbs samplers for this model for the three representative contracts were
generally well-behaved.  Table 9 summarizes the coefficient posteriors (based on diffuse
priors).  The clustering probabilities k and direction classification probabilities piC  are
similar to those from the simpler model of discreteness and clustering found earlier.
Are the trade impact coefficients statistically significantly different from zero?
Since they are estimated from priors with nonnegative support, the answer is, “Yes, by
assumption”.  It is perhaps more useful to gauge the implied economic significance of
these estimates.  We offer two approaches
First, Figure 3 graphs the price impact functions implied by the estimates.  The
vertical scale (change in log price times one hundred) is approximately “percentage price
change” associated with a purchase of a given number of contracts.  Each graph reports
two curves, corresponding to the lag zero and (cumulative) lag one impacts.  For a trade
of, say, ten contracts, the price impact is largest for the pork belly contract
(approximately 11 basis points), lower for the Deutschemark contract (0.7 basis points)
and lowest for the S&P contract (0.3 basis points).
Secondly, it was suggested in Section 6 that (by way of comparison to the equity
studies) it is useful to compare the magnitudes of trade- and non-trade-related sources of
volatility.  Table 10 summarizes these calculations.  In accounting for total volatility,
trades appear most important for the Deutschemark contract (roughly forty percent), of
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lesser importance for the pork belly contract (twenty percent), and markedly less
important for the S&P contract (three percent).  A corresponding figure for an NYSE
equity might be around twenty percent (Hasbrouck (1991b)), i.e., close to the middle of
the three futures contracts considered here.
The economic models of sequential trade identify permanent trade price impacts
with asymmetric information, private information that can be revealed in the price only
through trade.  From this perspective, it is perhaps not surprising that a significant
proportion of volatility in the pork belly market originates from trades.  There are, for this
contract, few alternative sources of price discovery.
For the Deutschemark, on the other hand, the volume of trade that occurs in the
futures market is small relative to that occurring in the interbank spot and forward
markets.11  The conventional view is that price discovery occurs in the interbank market.
The futures contract is often supposed to serve as a hedging and speculation vehicle for
participants too small to obtain easy access to the larger market.   One would therefore
expect DM futures prices to follow passively the path established in the interbank market.
The contribution of futures trades to price discovery implied by the present model (forty
percent) seems implausibly high.
To explore this further, we consider absolute trade impacts.  One hundred DM
contracts in the futures market, a fairly substantial trade, corresponds to DM 12.5 million
(roughly $7 million).  By the scale of the interbank market, however, this is a very
modest trade.  The permanent price impact implied by the present estimates is 0.00014,
i.e., 1.4 basis points.  The interbank market conventionally quotes in DM per U.S. dollar
(the reverse of the futures convention).  At the sample average price, this corresponds to
roughly 1.8 DM/$.  At this level, the 1.4 basis point shift would imply a movement of
                                                
11
 Recent microstructure studies of the latter include Lyons (1995); Goodhart, Ito, and
Payne (1996); Lyons (1997) and Evans (1998).
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0.000025.  This large, but not grossly out of line with trade/price movements found on
the electronic limit order books systems (EBS and Reuters D2000-2).
An important consideration here is that transparency in the interbank market is
low. The public record of the interbank market is limited to indicative (nonfirm) bids and
offers. Trades that occur on the electronic book systems are visible only to other
subscribers, a essentially the large intermarket banks themselves.  Neither trades
occurring directly between two participants nor those mediated by brokers are publicly
reported.
In the interbank market, the tick (pip) size is 0.0001 DM/$.  On a relative value
basis, this is about half the 0.0001 $/DM tick for the futures contract. Hasbrouck (1998b)
nevertheless finds that in 1996, the average spread is roughly six  ticks (pips),  and the
quotes are highly clustered at five-tick multiples.  Thus, the implied price impact of the
futures trade estimated above falls well within the typical spread.   The usefulness of the
Reuters indicative quotes as a timely, high-resolution signal for futures price discovery
appears doubtful.  It seems reasonable to hypothesize that trades in the futures market are
driven by information that may well have originated in the interbank market, but is
“private” in the sense of not being widely reported.  Far from being a subsidiary player in
this market, the futures market may be serving as the primary public forum of price
discovery.
We turn now to discussion of the trade impacts for the S&P contract.  In absolute
terms (Figure 3) and especially in relative terms (Table 1) these are extremely, perhaps
implausibly, low.  While the cash market exists as a meaningful alternative for price
discovery, the stock index futures market is customarily viewed as originating the
primary signals of common factor equity movements.  Both the numerous studies
documenting index price leadership in the futures markets, and the studies that address
regulatory concerns support this view.
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In considering model adequacy, it is noteworthy that the index futures market is
substantially more active than the other two contracts.  Section 2 noted an average
intertrade time of four seconds and raised the possibility of associated informational
delays.  It is highly likely that for this contract, the one lag allowed in the model for the
trade impact is much too abbreviated.  This possibility bears further investigation.
8. Conclusions
This paper proposes and implements powerful strategies to estimate empirical
microstructure models in the absence of a full data record.  The centerpiece model is a
structural model of bid and ask quotes and trades that incorporates discreteness,
clustering and asymmetric information.  Yet for all its richness, it can be estimated solely
from reported transaction (price and volume) data.  The analysis is made possible by
recent advances in Markov chain Monte Carlo estimation, which simplify inference in
latent-data models.
The paper presents a preliminary analysis of a dozen high-volume contracts, and a
more detailed study of three representative contracts: pork bellies, the Deutschemark and
the S&P Composite Index.
Preliminary analysis of futures transaction price data suggests price clustering
(affinity for natural multiples of the minimum tick) that is, for certain contracts, quite
pronounced.  Clustering is very strong for the pork belly contract; small for the S&P
contract and negligible for the DM contract.  It is not determined whether this clustering
arises from negotiation-cost minimization or market power of floor traders.
The model also provides evidence on trade-price impacts and the importance of
trades as sources of permanent price movements.  For the S&P contract, the price impact
of a trade is low: a hypothetical ten-contract purchase order moves the price by only 0.3
basis points (0.00003%).  Of the total permanent volatility, only three percent is
attributed to trades.  Taken at face value, this implies a minimal informational role for the
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S&P index futures market.  The estimated specification, however, permits only the
current and most recent lagged trade to drive the price change.  The pace of trading in the
S&P contract is sufficiently high that price impacts may be distributed over a greater
number of lagged trades.
For the pork belly contract, the estimated impact of a 10-contract purchase is 11
basis points, and roughly twenty percent of the long-term price volatility is attributed to
trades.  The latter figure is comparable to that found in equity market studies and suggests
a strong informational role for trading.
The estimated impact of ten-contract purchase in the DM contract is low (0.7
basis points), but the share of long-term volatility attributed to trades is, at forty percent,
the highest.  The latter figure implies that futures market trading contributes significantly
to the price discovery process.  This runs counter to the conventional wisdom that price
determination in foreign exchange occurs in the interbank spot/forward market.
Transparency in the interbank market, however, is low.  Given that interbank trades are
not reported, it is perhaps not surprising that the publicly-reported (though smaller)
futures trades play a substantial role in price discovery.
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Appendix: Standard Bayesian Results
For the reader’s convenience, this appendix summarizes some key Bayesian
results used in the body of the paper.  They are fairly standard (see, for example, Carlin
and Louis (1996), Tanner (1996), Press (1989) or Zellner (1971)).
a. Univariate normal random variables.
Suppose that a random variable ( )2,~ σµNx , and that we possess a sample of
independent observations nixi ,,1 , K= .  A convenient (conjugate) prior for the mean
parameter is ( ) ( )2,τµµpi priorN= .  Suppose that the variance σ2 is known.  Then the
posterior is ( ) ( ) ( )postpostNxfxf ,2,τµµµ == , where
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22
22
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τσ
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τσ
τµσµ
nn
xn post
prior
post
+
=
+
+
= (24)
In the limit as ∞→τ , we arrive at the uninformative (improper) prior with
corresponding posterior parameters nx postpost 2,2  ; στµ == .  In any case, a random
posterior draw consists of a draw from a normal density.
Some model parameters in this paper have truncated priors.  (Most commonly, a
parameter is asserted to be nonnegative.)  Denote by ( )2,τµTN  the normal density with
mean µ and variance τ2 truncated to some region of the real line.  The truncation changes
the normalization of the density.  Furthermore if ( )2,~ τµTNx , µ≠Ex and ( ) 2Var τ≠x .
Nevertheless, the above results go through as before. That is, if our prior
is ( ) ( )2,τµµpi priorTN= , then the posterior is ( ) ( ) ( )postpostTNxfxf ,2,τµµµ == , i.e., a
density with the same posterior parameters and a truncation region that is identical to the
truncation of the prior.  NB: this result goes through because the truncation region is not
data-dependent.
With normal observations, a convenient prior for the variance parameter is
( ) ( )priorpriorIG βασpi ,2 = , the inverse gamma distribution. Based on a sample of
observations iid normal with known mean µ, the posterior is ( ) ( )postpostIGxf βασ ,2 =
where
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The improper prior ( ) 22 1 σσpi ∝ is obtained by letting 0== priorprior βα .  The posterior
is then proportional to the inverse chi-square density: ( ) 222 ~ −
=∑ − ndfixx χµσ
b. The Bayesian Gaussian linear model
The model is iii uxy += β  where xi is a row vector of known data, β is a column
coefficient vector and ( )2,0~ uiidi Nu σ .  A conjugate prior for the coefficient vector is the
multivariate normal: ( ) ( )priorpriorN Σ= ,µβpi .  Assuming 2uσ  known, the posterior is
( ) ( )postpostNyf Σ= ,µβ  where
( ) ( ) ( )
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The improper coefficient prior is obtained by letting priorΣ  become “large” (while
remaining positive definite).  If the prior is truncated to some region, the posterior is also
truncated.  Assuming β known, the variance parameter 2uσ  may be handled exactly as in
the normal univariate case above, using the model residuals βiii xyu −= in lieu of the
deviations from the mean.
c. The Bernoulli/Binomial Model
Suppose xi is a Bernoulli random variable:
( )

−
=
k
k
xi 1 prob.  w.,0
 prob.  w.,1 (27)
A convenience prior for the probability parameter k is the beta distribution, denoted
( )priorpriorB βα , .  Setting 1== priorprior βα  gives the uniform prior; the Jeffreys
(noninformative) prior is obtained with 21== priorprior βα .  Suppose that we possess a
sample of N observations, of which n are “hits” (instances of xi=1).  The posterior for k is
( )postpostB βα ,  where npriorpost += αα  and nNpriorpost −+= ββ .
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Table 1.  Contract Descriptions.
Notes: Contracts traded on the Chicago Mercantile Exchange for the indicated underlying and maturity.  Averages are computed over
all trades from January 5 to January 16, 1998.  The units of the average contract value for the Euroyen contract are Y1,000.
Underlying
Maturity,
1998
Average
Price Units Tick Size Contract Size
Average
Contract
Value
($1,000)
Tick Size as
% of
Average
Price
Feeder Cattle Mar 76.17 Cents/Lb 0.025 50,000 Lb 38 0.033
Live Cattle Feb 64.64 Cents/Lb 0.025 40,000 Lb 26 0.039
Pork Bellies Feb 49.48 Cents/Lb 0.025 40,000 Lb 20 0.051
Australian Dollar Mar 0.65 US$/AD 0.0001 100,000 AD 65 0.015
Canadian Dollar Mar 0.70 US$/CD 0.0001 100,000 CD 70 0.014
Deutsche Mark Mar 0.55 US$/DM 0.0001 125,000 DM 69 0.018
Japanese Yen Mar 0.77 $.01US/JY 0.0001 12.5 MillionY 96 0.013
Swiss Franc Mar 0.68 US$/SF 0.0001 125,000 SF 85 0.015
13wk Treasury Bill Mar 95.22 Pts of 100% 0.005 $1 Million 952 0.005
Eurodollar Mar 94.42 Pts of 100% 0.005 $1 Million 944 0.005
Euroyen Mar 99.12 Pts of 100% 0.005 100 MillionY 99,124 0.005
One-Month LIBOR Jan 94.39 Pts of 100% 0.005 $3 Million 2,832 0.005
Nasdaq 100 Mar 1,000.76 Index Pts 0.05 $100 x Index 100 0.005
Nikkei 225 Index Mar 15,016.08 Index Pts 5 $5 x Index 75 0.033
S&P 500 Index Mar 961.65 Index Pts 0.1 $250 x Index 240 0.010
S&P Midcap 400 Index Mar 324.01 Index Pts 0.05 $500 x Index 162 0.015
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Table 2.  Trading Statistics
Trading activity in the indicated CME contracts from January 5, 1998 to January 16,
1998.
Contracts per Trade
Avg.
Trades
Per Day Min 25%’ile Median 50%’ile Max
Avg. Inter-
trade time
(seconds)
Feeder Cattle 301 1 1 3 7 179 47
Live Cattle 604 1 2 5 11 414 23
Pork Bellies 300 1 1 2 4 188 45
Australian Dollar 105 1 1 2 7 296 224
Canadian Dollar 503 1 1 3 10 485 47
Deutsche Mark 895 1 2 6 16 864 26
Japanese Yen 1,211 1 2 5 11 1,550 19
Swiss Franc 908 1 2 4 10 619 26
13wk Treasury Bill 34 1 1 5 25 1,525 686
Eurodollar 492 1 40 100 280 3,587 49
Euroyen 42 1 2 5 27 510 565
One-Month LIBOR 33 1 12 40 80 700 738
Nasdaq 100 484 1 1 4 10 250 50
Nikkei 225 Index 129 1 2 5 10 133 204
S&P 500 Index 5,526 1 3 9 22 805 4
S&P Midcap 400 Index 109 1 2 3 7 52 225
Page 46
Table 3.  Intertransaction Price Properties
Sample of contracts traded on the Chicago Mercantile Exchange; all trades from January
5 to January 16, 1998.  Standard deviations and first-order autocorrelations of
intertransaction price changes.  The price is alternatively measured in logs or levels (for
the levels, the units are “ticks”).
Price Variable
Log: Level (Ticks):
( )( )Plog∆σ
x10,000 ( )( )Plog1 ∆ρ ( )P∆σ ( )P∆1ρ
Feeder Cattle 6.01 -0.18 1.83 -0.18
Live Cattle 4.57 -0.28 1.18 -0.28
Pork Bellies 14.44 -0.10 2.85 -0.10
Australian Dollar 7.12 -0.08 4.60 -0.08
Canadian Dollar 1.51 -0.27 1.06 -0.27
Deutschemark 1.76 -0.19 0.97 -0.19
Japanese Yen 2.04 -0.18 1.56 -0.18
Swiss Franc 1.86 -0.19 1.26 -0.19
13wk Treasury Bill 1.34 -0.04 2.55 -0.04
Eurodollar 0.37 -0.33 0.71 -0.33
Euroyen 0.37 -0.16 0.74 -0.16
One-Month LIBOR 0.38 -0.04 0.72 -0.04
Nasdaq 100 7.83 -0.09 15.61 -0.09
Nikkei 225 Index 11.98 -0.18 3.58 -0.18
S&P 500 Index 1.85 -0.28 1.81 -0.28
S&P Midcap 400 Index 9.92 -0.03 6.36 -0.03
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Table 4.  Clustering Frequencies ( )Cfκ
Sample of contracts traded on the Chicago Mercantile Exchange; all trades from January
5 to January 16, 1998.  The clustering frequency is ( )κκκ 1−= ff C  where fκ is the sample
frequency of trades prices that fall on a κ-multiple of the minimum tick.   (Since 1/κ  is
the expected value under the null hypothesis of uniformly distributed prices, Cfκ measures
“excess” clustering.)
Tick Multiple κ
2 4 5 8 10 20 25 40 50 100
Feeder Cattle 26% 14% -1% 6% 4% 3% -1% 2% 0% 0%
Live Cattle 9 6 0 3 1 1 0 0 0 0
Pork Bellies 36 24 1 12 8 6 0 2 2 2
Australian Dollar 5 4 23 3 13 8 5 5 2 0
Canadian Dollar 2 0 1 0 2 1 1 1 1 2
Deutsche Mark 1 1 2 0 1 0 1 0 0 1
Japanese Yen 2 1 4 0 3 1 1 0 1 0
Swiss Franc 1 1 1 0 2 2 1 1 0 0
13wk Treasury Bill 25 8 3 3 8 3 0 2 2 -1
Eurodollar 2 1 1 1 2 -1 -2 -1 -2 -1
Euroyen 9 -7 -1 -6 6 3 -4 0 -2 -1
One-Month LIBOR 9 11 0 1 2 5 3 8 -2 -1
Nasdaq 100 44 40 78 20 82 59 16 29 16 12
Nikkei 225 Index 28 20 12 11 15 9 2 4 1 2
S&P 500 Index 2 1 12 0 7 4 2 2 1 0
S&P Midcap 400 Index 42 22 18 11 23 13 4 5 5 3
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Table 5.  Incremental Clustering Frequencies ( )Cfκ∆
Sample of contracts traded on the Chicago Mercantile Exchange; all trades from January
5 to January 16, 1998.  The incremental clustering frequency is constructed to measure
clustering after controlling for clustering at the next finer level of resolution:
( ) CC fff 222 21 =−=∆ ; 2244 fff C −=∆ ; ( ) CC fff 555 51 =−=∆ ; 2488 fff C −=∆ ;
251010 fff C −=∆ ; 2102020 fff C −=∆ ; 552525 fff C −=∆ ; 2204040 fff C −=∆ ;
2255050 fff C −=∆ ; 250100100 fff C −=∆ , where fκ is the sample frequency of trades prices
that fall on a κ-multiple of the minimum tick.
Tick Multiple κ
2 4 5 8 10 20 25 40 50 100
Feeder Cattle 26% 1% -1% -1% 5% 1% -1% 0% 1% 0%
Live Cattle 9 2 0 0 2 0 0 -1 0 0
Pork Bellies 36 6 1 -1 8 1 0 0 2 1
Australian Dollar 5 1 23 1 2 1 0 1 0 -1
Canadian Dollar 2 -1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1
Deutsche Mark 1 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Japanese Yen 2 0 4 -1 1 0 0 -1 0 0
Swiss Franc 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 -1 0
13wk Treasury Bill 25 -4 3 -1 6 -1 0 0 2 -2
Eurodollar 2 -1 1 1 1 -2 -2 0 -1 0
Euroyen 9 -11 -1 -3 6 0 -4 -2 0 0
One-Month LIBOR 9 6 0 -5 2 4 3 5 -4 0
Nasdaq 100 44 18 78 0 43 18 0 0 9 3
Nikkei 225 Index 28 6 12 1 9 2 -1 0 1 1
S&P 500 Index 2 0 12 0 1 0 -1 0 0 0
S&P Midcap 400 Index 42 1 18 0 15 1 0 -1 3 0
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Table 6.  Moment Estimates of the Roll Model
Sample of contracts traded on the Chicago Mercantile Exchange; all trades from January
5 to January 16, 1998.  Standard deviations and first-order autocorrelations of
intertransaction price changes.  The price is alternatively measured in logs or levels (for
the levels, the units are “ticks”).  uσ  is the standard deviation of the random-walk
(“efficient price”) component in the model; c is the half-spread.
Price Variable
Log: Level (Ticks):
000,10×uσ 000,10×c uσ c
Feeder Cattle 4.78 2.58 1.46 0.79
Live Cattle 3.02 2.43 0.78 0.63
Pork Bellies 12.97 4.49 2.56 0.88
Australian Dollar 6.54 1.99 4.22 1.29
Canadian Dollar 1.03 0.78 0.72 0.54
Deutschemark 1.40 0.76 0.77 0.42
Japanese Yen 1.64 0.86 1.26 0.65
Swiss Franc 1.47 0.80 1.00 0.54
13wk Treasury Bill 1.28 0.28 2.43 0.53
Eurodollar 0.22 0.22 0.41 0.41
Euroyen 0.31 0.15 0.62 0.29
One-Month LIBOR 0.36 0.08 0.69 0.14
Nasdaq 100 7.13 2.29 14.22 4.56
Nikkei 225 Index 9.65 5.03 2.87 1.51
S&P 500 Index 1.23 0.98 1.20 0.96
S&P Midcap 400 Index 9.63 1.70 6.15 1.16
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Table 7.  Gibbs Sampler Estimates of the Roll Model.
Gibbs-sampler estimates of price dynamics for the indicated CME contracts,  first 1,000
observations in the two-week sample January 5, 1998 through January 16, 1998. σu is the
implicit efficient price (random-walk) variance; c is the (log) half-spread; Cpi is the
probability that a given trade is correctly classified (buy vs. sell).  “Mean”, “Mode” and
“Std.Dev.” refer to the posterior distribution; “SEM” is the standard error of the mean,
corrected for autocorrelation in the draws.
Pork Belly Mean Mode SEM Std.Dev.
000,10×uσ 13.484 13.456 0.005 0.310
000,10×c 1.092 1.142 0.007 0.426
%55ˆ =Cpi
Deutschemark Mean Mode SEM Std.Dev.
000,10×uσ 1.080 1.080 0.001 0.031
000,10×c 0.881 0.885 0.001 0.029
%86ˆ =Cpi
S&P Mean Mode SEM Std.Dev.
000,10×uσ 1.629 1.633 0.001 0.045
000,10×c 0.849 0.842 0.001 0.048
%77ˆ =Cpi
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Table 8.  Estimation Results for the Discrete, Clustered Price Model
Notes: Gibbs-sampler estimates of price dynamics for the indicated CME contracts,  first
1,000 observations in the two-week sample January 5, 1998 through January 16, 1998. σu
is the implicit efficient price (random-walk) variance; κ  is the (preset) clustering
multiple; k is the probability that a transaction price is clustered; Cpi is the probability that
a given trade is correctly classified (buy vs. sell).  “Mean” , “Mode” and “Std.Dev.” refer
to the posterior distribution; “SEM” is the standard error of the mean, corrected for
autocorrelation in the draws.
Pork Belly Mean Mode SEM Std.Dev.
410×uσ 11.595 11.570 0.008 0.327
k 0.739 0.743 0.001 0.021
%71ˆ =Cpi ; κ=2
Deutschemark Mean Mode SEM Std.Dev.
410×uσ 1.017 1.014 0.001 0.037
k 0.003 0.000 0.000 0.004
%81ˆ =Cpi ; κ=2
S&P Mean Mode SEM Std.Dev.
410×uσ 1.545 1.532 0.001 0.049
k 0.043 0.040 0.000 0.011
%70ˆ =Cpi ; κ=5
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Table 9.  Estimation Results for the Asymmetric Information Model
Notes: Gibbs-sampler estimates of price dynamics for the indicated CME contracts,  first
1,000 observations in the two-week sample January 5, 1998 through January 16, 1998. σu
is the residual (non trade) variance; κ  is the (preset) clustering multiple; k is the
probability that a transaction price is clustered; the λ’s are trade impact coefficients; Cpi is
the probability that a given trade is correctly classified (buy vs. sell).  “Mean”, “Mode”
and “Std.Dev.” refer to the posterior distribution; “SEM” is the standard error of the
mean, corrected for autocorrelation in the draws.
Pork Belly Mean Mode SEM Std.Dev.
2%;81ˆ == κpi C 410×uσ 9.8113 9.7544 0.0216 0.4751
k 0.7396 0.7417 0.0006 0.0209
4
,0 10×Constλ 0.0490 0.0141 0.0010 0.0427
4
,0 10×λ 0.1875 0.1926 0.0011 0.0329
4
,1 10×Constλ 0.0558 0.0169 0.0014 0.0512
4
,1 10×λ 0.1208 0.1190 0.0009 0.0322
Deutschemark Mean Mode SEM Std.Dev.
2%;88ˆ == κpi C 410×uσ 0.7921 0.7831 0.0018 0.0401
k 0.0038 0.0007 0.0002 0.0050
4
,0 10×Constλ 0.0051 0.0018 0.0001 0.0038
4
,0 10×λ 0.0048 0.0051 0.0000 0.0010
4
,1 10×Constλ 0.0341 0.0347 0.0004 0.0088
4
,1 10×λ 0.0050 0.0048 0.0001 0.0017
S&P Mean Mode SEM Std.Dev.
5%;72ˆ == κpi C 410×uσ 1.5271 1.5287 0.0014 0.0570
k 0.0417 0.0382 0.0004 0.0112
4
,0 10×Constλ 0.0107 0.0032 0.0002 0.0081
4
,0 10×λ 0.0019 0.0005 0.0000 0.0016
4
,1 10×Constλ 0.0058 0.0017 0.0001 0.0053
4
,1 10×λ 0.0022 0.0019 0.0000 0.0015
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Table 10.  Derived Statistics for Asymmetric Information Model
Notes: Gibbs-sampler estimates of price dynamics for the indicated CME contracts,  first
1,000 observations in the two-week sample January 5, 1998 through January 16, 1998.  In
the model m is the implicit (log) efficient price; the table summarizes the sources of its
variance. “Mean”, “Mode” and “Std.Dev.” refer to the posterior distribution; “SEM” is
the standard error of the mean, corrected for autocorrelation in the draws.
Pork Belly Contribution to
( ) 610×∆ tmVar Mean Mode SEM Std.Dev.
Non-trade 0.9649 0.9441 0.0043 0.0940
Trade 0.2604 0.2655 0.0019 0.0515
Total 1.2252 1.2011 0.0031 0.0821
Deutschemark Contribution to
( ) 610×∆ tmVar Mean Mode SEM Std.Dev.
Non-trade 0.0063 0.0061 0.0000 0.0006
Trade 0.0039 0.0039 0.0000 0.0006
Total 0.0101 0.0100 0.0000 0.0007
S&P Contribution to
( ) 610×∆ tmVar Mean Mode SEM Std.Dev.
Non-trade 0.0234 0.0233 0.0000 0.0017
Trade 0.0007 0.0005 0.0000 0.0004
Total 0.0241 0.0239 0.0000 0.0017
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Figure 1.  Gibbs Sampler Results for the Basic Roll Model, Pork Belly Contract.
Gibbs-sampler estimates of price dynamics for the pork belly contract,  first 1,000
observations in the two-week sample January 5, 1998 through January 16, 1998.  The
estimated model has two parameters, the log random-walk standard deviation,
000,10×uσ  (“SD_u”) and the log half-spread 000,10×c .   The left-most graph plots the
actual draws (every tenth draw); the center graph is the autocorrelogram; the right-most
graph is the distribution histogram.
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Figure 2. Gibbs Sampler Results for the Discrete Price Model, Pork Belly Contract
Gibbs-sampler estimates of price dynamics for the pork belly contract,  first 1,000
observations in the two-week sample January 5, 1998 through January 16, 1998.  The
estimated model has two parameters, the log random-walk standard deviation,
000,10×uσ  (“SD_u”) and the mean of the half-spread c.   The left-most graph plots the
actual draws (every tenth draw); the center graph is the autocorrelogram; the right-most
graph is the distribution histogram.
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Figure 3.  Implied Trade Price Impacts
Notes: Figures are based Gibbs-sampler estimates of price dynamics for the indicated
contracts,  first 1,000 observations in the two-week sample January 5, 1998 through
January 16, 1998.  Each figure depicts the contemporaneous and cumulative (through the
first lag) impact of a purchase on the implicit log efficient price x 100 (i.e.,  the vertical
units are approximately percentage changes).
